While the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji has no solid basis in the international criminal law documents,i n the eyes of the victims and the general public the majority Trial Chamber decision can be seen as the lost hope of being compensated for the suffered harm. This is due to the fact that the reparation principles arising from Article 75 (1) of the Rome Statute are based on the concept of individual criminal responsibility, rather than on the State's responsibility. Nevertheless, one of the aims of this article is to emphasise that the reparations provisions contained in the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence are vague and that no overarching guidelines exist to assist the different Trial and Appeals Chambers to conduct efficient reparations proceedings. The adoption of principles in the Ruto and Sang case could simply clarified to an extent the reparation process in that case, even when these principles would not necessarily apply to future cases. In such view, the majority decision is seen as a lost chance to clarify the law on the reparation issue in circumstances where the case was terminated on the no-case basis. In the lack of a specialised reparations Chamber, it is clear that the question of reparation following a trial (however concluded or terminated) falls to the Trial Chamber that conducted the relevant trial.
INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2016, the ICC Trial Chamber V(A) (Trial Chamber) left without answers key questions on victims reparation central to the ICC's firstever Decision Vacating the Charges 11 , in which, by majority terminated the case against William Ruto and Joshua Sang. 12 The International Criminal Court (ICC) has upheld that this Trial Chamber cannot take any decision on reparation issues correlated with the Ruto and Sang case under Article 75 of the Rome Statute because with the termination of the Ruto and Sang case the Chamber lost jurisdiction over that substance. Now, with this decision, the Court confirmed that conviction is a conditio sine qua non for any order for reparations issued by the Court, without the need to take into consideration the views and concerns of victims. While the Trial Chamber decision seems to be harmonious with the Court's legal framework, the Ruto and Sang case demonstrates that the procedural requirement of the reparation provision (Article 75 of the Rome Statute) may come into tension with the victims 'expectations to be compensated for the suffered harm. Tension between the procedural requirements of the reparation provision and the right to reparation for victims have arisen in the Decision Vacating the Charges, where the Presiding Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji 13 concurred with the Judge Fremr' arguments.
14 A debate has emerged whether the conviction of the accused is a precondition of reparation order given the fact that such interpretation would be dissatisfactory to the victims of 2007-2008 postelection violence. This is particularly significant, given that the termination of the case on the no-case basis signals an unfortunate turn in the search for truth and accountability for the violations experienced by Kenya's victims during post-election violence by the ICC.
This article lies important questions relating to reparations for which victims of post-election violence in Kenya have waited, and continue to wait. It involves two institutional players, the majority Trial Chamber and the victims represented by the common Legal Representative for Victims (LRV) supported by the Dissenting Judge Eboe-Osuji, with different mandates giving rise to different vision of the reparation system of the ICC. On the one hand, the Trial Chamber supported the general view that the reparation principles arising from Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute are based on the concept of individual criminal responsibility, rather than reparations based on 11 Decision Vacating the Charges (n 4), para 464. 12 Decision on Reparations (n 2), para 7. 13 Decision Vacating the Charges (n 4) -Reasons of Judge Eboe-Osuji 58. 14 Decision Vacating the Charges (n 4) -Reasons of Judge Fremr 3. OF THE POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE: NO REPARATION  WITHOUT CONVICTION  PROSECUTOR V. WILLIAM SAMOEI RUTO AND  JOSHUA ARAP SANG,  DECISION ON THE REQUEST REGARDING  REPARATIONS, 1 JULY 2016   113 state responsibility. On the other, Judge Eboe-Osuji in his opinion on the Ruto and Sang case, wondered aloud whether there may be "scope for the Court to require the Government to make adequate reparation to the victims of postelection violence." 15 The Judge proposed that a State's meddling in a prosecution -as Kenya has -could trigger the court's jurisdiction to issue an order of reparations against that State. He provided Article 4 (1) of the Rome Statute, as a legal basis for the Court to have "such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the fulfillment of its purpose." Taking these two views into consideration, the main question is whether the victims right to get reparation for the injury suffered cab be reconciled with the institutional obligation to be eligible only to order reparation when the person standing trial is found guilty? This article reflects fundamental tension within the requirements of the reparation order and the victims expectation to reparation for harm suffered. Ocampo promised all victims, their families and the word that Kenya would be an example on how to provide justice for the victims. 20 In his speech, the ICC Prosecutor Ocampo said that "[t]hese were not just crimes against innocent Kenyans", but "[t]hey were crimes against humanity as a whole" and he promised that these prosecution would "break the cycle of impunity for massive crimes" and provide victims and their families with justice. 21 But the ICC Court has delivered of none of the above promised. Charges have not been confirmed or were withdrawn relating to above-mentioned six suspects, including the termination of the latest Ruto and Sang case in 2016. 22 In its place, the hope for justice through conviction of two reminded accused, Mr. Ruto and Mr. Sang for victims and their families has been crushed. against the latest two accused from "Ocampo six"-Mr. Ruto and Mr. Sang, "without prejudice to their prosecution afresh in future". 24 When the Prosecution finished its case, the Defence demanded the Chamber to end the case and acquit the accused on account of the weak Prosecution evidence. 25 The Chamber, by majority, after a review of the Prosecution evidence, ruled that the Prosecutor had failed to present sufficient evidence linking Ruto and Sang to the direct perpetrators of the crimes. Consequently, neither of the two accused have a case to answer under the Prosecution charges. 26 The standard result of a conclusion that there is "no case to answer" 27 for the accused would be an acquittal. However, by reasons of the evidence and submissions presented to the Chamber, the majority of judges determined that the judgment of the acquittal was not a good solution and only the vacation of the charges could take place. 28 Due to the Ruto and Sang case ended without a conviction, the majority assumed that the reparations order cannot be made by this Court in accordance to Article 75 of the Rome Statute for the victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence in Kenya. 29 Furthermore, the majority of the judges concluded in one sentence that even though the judgment is dissatisfactory to the victims, the Court can only recompense for harm suffered as a consequence of crimes for which the person standing trial has been found guilty.
2016] ICC COURT DECISION ON REPARATION FOR VICTIMS

I. PROMISE OF THE ICC PROSECUTOR
II. TERMINATION OF
30 Judge Eboe-Osuji in his reasoning, disagreed with the majority's interpretation. He said that it would be equally "unnecessary and undesirable that a conviction is a prerequisite to reparation" 31 precisely 24 Decision Vacating the Charges (n 4) 1. 25 ibid 1. 26 In reaching its decision, the Trial Chamber invoked the Article 64 (2) of the Rome Statute which enforces the obligation upon the Trial Chamber to conduct the fair and expeditious trial. The Trial Chamber established that "there is no provision in the ICC basic documents that requires a Trial Chamber to continue with the presentation of evidence on behalf of the defence, where the evidentiary case for the prosecution was not strong enough to warrant inviting the defence to present their case"; see Decision Vacating the Charges (n 4), para 146. 27 "The Statute and Rules do not currently explicitly provide for 'no case to answer' submission. However, Article 64 (3) (a) of the Statute sets out that the Chamber shall "[c]onfer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings". It has also been correctly suggested that the Chamber could entertain 'no case to answer' motions pursuant to its power to decide on any other relevant matter, as contained in Article 64(6)(f) of the Statute. Similarly, Rule 134 of the Rules confers broad powers on the Chamber to rule on 'any issue concerning the conduct of the proceedings' and on 'issues that arise during the course of the trial'. These provisions grant the Chamber the necessary authority to consider 'no case to answer' motions in appropriate circumstances. 32 In the given case, the parties never challenged the incidence of the post-election violence 33 and the overall findings of the Waki Commission in this respect (Waki Report). 34 The evidential difficulty was only relating to the responsibility of Ruto and Sang for that violence. In such situations, how it could happen that the victims of the post-election are left with no reparation right for their harm? 35 Under the circumstances of the Ruto and Sang case, the Judge clearly reflected that there are legal grounds both in international law and national laws which reject the "no compensation without conviction" doctrine. 36 
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The footnote for this statement cites New Zealand, Ontario (Canada), the United Kingdom, and Western Australia. In this regard, he suggested that Article 4 (1) provides the Rome Statute with jurisdiction to make determinations of State responsibility -even if only for the purposes of reparations decisions, further confined to the limited set of cases where there is clear evidence of State interference. That being the case, the Judge emphasised that right of the victims to reparation should be addressed because the termination of the case "were polluted by undue interference and political meddling". 39 The termination of the case in such circumstances should not hinder the victims' right to reparation or as a matter of the obligation of Kenya or the international community. 40 In the view of Judge Eboe-Osuji, this is not only the State responsibility but also of international community to react on the harm suffered by the victims of the post-election violence by recognizing the victims' right to reparation. 41 
III. VICTIMS' VIEWS AND CONCERNS
In the Victims' Views and Concerns, the LRV agreed with the Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji on the issue that "there is no general principle of law that requires conviction as a prerequisite to reparation." 43 It was argued that in the case with no conviction of the accused -reparations might be ordered through the Trust Fund for Victims, or against a third party (e.g., a State) on the basis of the obligation to provide reparations established in international law. 44 The LRV argued that taking into consideration the specific circumstances in which the charges against the accused in this case were vacated, the right to reparation does not die with the decision vacating of the charges. As such, Kenya had a obligation to defend its people and all other persons who found themselves on its territory, to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 48 Even the President Uhuru Kenyatta acknowledged officially on March 26 th , 2015, the failure on the part of Kenya to prevent the violence and protect its population. 49 In this regard, the LRV submitted also that Kenya as a State "meddled itself into the jurisdiction of the ICC" and should be obliged under international law to provide "adequate, effective and prompt reparation" to the sufferers of the post-election violence. 50 In particular, the LRV stated that this obligation arises due to acts and omissions on the Government's part which amount to internationally illegal acts. The prevailing political situation in Kenya and the long passage of time since the incidence of the violence constitute two reasons that make reparations for victims merit urgent consideration. Accordingly, the LRV in the Victims' Views and Concerns asked the Trial Chamber first to establish that the Government of Kenya bears an obligation to provide reparation to victims of the 2007-2008 post-election violence for the harm suffered and second to make an order directed at the Trust Fund for Victims to provide assistance to all victims of the post-election violence in accordance with its assistance mandate.
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While the general principle of law requires a conviction as a prerequisite to reparations, the presented circumstances of the Ruto and Case case should not prevent the judges from entertaining questions of reparation in the absence of conviction. 52 The majority determined however that LRV no longer have standing to make requests before the Trial Chamber in the background of the Ruto and Sang case. At the same time, the chance of clarifying the victim's right to reparation when the case is terminated on the no-case basis, has been lost.
IV. MAJORITY OF THE TRIAL CHAMBER V(A) VERSUS DISSENTING OPINION
The Trial Chamber in the Decision on Reparations decided that those victims who took part in Kenya case will not receive compensation because no conviction has been made. 53 The two in majority judges 54 . 56 In that regard, the majority assumed that this Chamber is not the right place to entertain such views and concerns. 57 Certainly, the Trial Chamber upheld a debatable reasons of Judge Fremr presented in the Trial Chamber Decision Vacating the Charges that as a consequence of the case ending with no conviction, the reparations order cannot be made by the Trial Chamber pursuant to Article 75 of the Rome Statute for the advantage of victims of the post-election violence. 58 Even such decision is dissatisfactory to the victims, the ICC can only order compensation for harm suffered as an effect of crimes if such crimes are found to take place and the person standing trial is found guilty. 59 Again, Judge Eboe-Osuji intensely disagreed with his colleague judges, providing in his Dissenting Opinion a quotation from 1989 dissenting opinion from US Supreme Court Judge A. Blackman, in which Judge Blackman charges the majority of retreating "into sterile formalism". 60 "With respect, I see no convincing basis in law for the idea that an ICC Trial Chamber may not entertain questions of reparation merely because the accused they tried was not found guilty," marked Judge Eboe-Osuji. 61 In the view of Judge, such formal tactic could never supply a convincing system of reasoning that prevents the ICC Trial Chamber from considering the questions of reparations in the lack of conviction. 62 What is even more important, the Judge Eboe-Osuji notices that unlike other international Tribunals as the ICTY and ICTR that have been "virtually exclusively concerned with punitive justice", the juristic circumstances of the ICC are more expansive in scope, "specifically because this Court's Statute actively recognises the need to administer reparative justice, too". 63 The reparative system of the ICC requires that the aspect of reparation justice is given its own unique value, without unfair prejudice to the rights of accused. Everything less will be weaken the reparation system as an integral part of justice in the Court. concerning reparation for victims and there are no words of restriction that limit the circumstances in which those principles may be established. 65 The circumstances do not prevent from the examination the termination of proceedings either upon an acquittal or on the basis that there is no case to answer at the end prosecution' case. 66 In other words, because the decision to terminate the Ruto and Sang case was on the basis of "no case to answer" application, which was a first for the ICC, then it was necessary for the judges to have considered whether there were principles of reparation that could have been set for such a situation.
The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eboe-Osuji can be seen as a call on the competent organs of the Court to develop and adopt clear principles on reparation in accordance with Article 75 of the Rome Statute. This could have helped to fill gaps in the ICC's basic reparation framework and helped to establish the guidelines which could assist the different Trial and Appeals Chambers to conduct efficient reparations proceedings in similar cases before the Court.
V. UNDERSTANDING THE REPARATIONS ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
Those who are lawyers can understand the legal reasoning presented by the majority of the judges presented in the Decision on Reparations. he Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation" 68 In this regard, the Rome Statute system is breaking new legal ground as its actors engage in an effort to order, fund, and implement reparations under the umbrella of international criminal law. Equally, the ad hoc Tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provided a structure where victims may seek reparations at the national level -in domestic courts, nonetheless it is doubtful if these kinds of resources ever exist in national organisations. 69 However, as the Rwanda example shows, although damages were compensated in Rwanda as a consequence of proceedings in national law, they have yet not been imposed due to absence of funds at the national level. These missed opportunities for awarding reparations for the ICTY/ICTR victims highlight the relevance and importance of the ICC's reparations system that learns from the ICTY and ICTR mistakes. While the presence of a provision on victim reparations in the ICC Rome Statute confers the responsibility on the ICC to afford justice to victims who suffered from the crimes committed by the accused, the trial on the reparations cannot take place until the conviction is achieved. 71 In this regard, in 2012, the ICC's Trial Chamber I delivered its first-ever decision on reparations (TC Decision) pursuant to Article 75 of the Rome Statute in the Lubanga case authorizing collective reparations and making this order "through" the ICC Trust Fund. 72 The Appeals Chamber's March 2015 judgment (Judgment on the appeals) partially overturned the TC Decision, but more relevant for the issue of reparation it established five fundamental elements of each reparation order. 73 The Appeals Chamber explained that that the legal reparation order must contain, at a minimum, five necessary elements. These are: "1) it must be directed against the convicted person; 2) it must establish and inform the convicted person of his or her liability with respect to the reparations awarded in the order; 3) it must specify, and provide reasons for, the type of reparations ordered, either collective, individual or both, pursuant to rules 97 (1) and 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 4) it must define the harm caused to direct and indirect victims as a result of the crimes for which the person was convicted, as well as identify the modalities of reparations that the Trial Chamber considers appropriate based on the circumstances of the specific case before it; and 5) it must identify the victims eligible to benefit from the awards for reparations or set out the criteria of eligibility based on the link between the harm suffered by the victims and the crimes for which the person was convicted." 74 In the Lubanga case, through the establishment of the five essential elements of the reparation order, the Appeals Chamber clarified a vision of 77 An order "cannot stand without a convicted person" because case of acquittal or a process otherwise ending without conviction does not allow for reparations". 78 The ICC considers that reparations must reflect the context from which they arise, which, at the Court, is a legal system of establishing individual criminal liability for crimes under the Statute. This perspective strongly suggests that reparation orders are fundamentally connected to the individual whose criminal accountability is established in a conviction and whose liability for those criminal acts is regulated in a sentence.
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CONCLUSIONS
The Decision on Reparations is the first to determine that the ICC has no jurisdiction to order for reparations when the charges had been vacated and where in fact no case exists. In addition, this decision confirms the general principle that a conviction is a conditio sine qua non for each reparation' order issued by the Court which is compatible with the Court's governing legal framework. In its place, from the victim's perspective this must be dissatisfactory to the victims and their families waiting the long eight-years for justice and reparations. Victims of the 2007-2008 postelection violence in Kenya lost their hope. Charges were not confirmed or were withdrawn regarding all six suspects responsible for acts of postelection violence in Kenya. They did not get investigated court justice. The final verdict of the last two suspects, delivered in Ruto and Sang case, freeing them reoffered to the vision of "troubling incidence of witness interference and intolerable political meddling". This puts a shadow over the suspects 75 ibid, para 64. 
